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Abstract
Nowadays, malware campaigns have reached a high level of sophistication, thanks to the
use of cryptography and covert communication channels over traditional protocols and services.
In this regard, a typical approach to evade botnet identification and takedown mechanisms is
the use of domain fluxing through the use of Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs). These
algorithms produce an overwhelming amount of domain names that the infected device tries to
communicate with to find the Command and Control server, yet only a small fragment of them
is actually registered. Due to the high number of domain names, the blacklisting approach is
rendered useless. Therefore, the botmaster may pivot the control dynamically and hinder botnet
detection mechanisms. To counter this problem, many security mechanisms result in solutions
that try to identify domains from a DGA based on the randomness of their name.
In this work, we explore hard to detect families of DGAs, as they are constructed to bypass
these mechanisms. More precisely, they are based on the use of dictionaries so the domains seem
to be user-generated. Therefore, the corresponding generated domains pass many filters that
look for, e.g. high entropy strings. To address this challenge, we propose an accurate and efficient
probabilistic approach to detect them. We test and validate the proposed solution through
extensive experiments with a sound dataset containing all the wordlist-based DGA families that
exhibit this behaviour and compare it with other state-of-the-art methods, practically showing
the efficacy and prevalence of our proposal.
Keywords: Malware, Botnets, Domain Generation Algorithm, DNS
1 Introduction
The ceaseless efforts of malware authors to enhance cybercrime with sophisticated techniques [32]
is creating a new “business” paradigm. Such a business has a myriad of monetisation sources [23]
including, but not limited to, ad injection [11], spamming [43], denial of service [44], ransomware-
based extorsion [2] or phishing [12]. In this regard, one of the most critical aspects of such malware
campaigns is the control and management of the compromised hosts. This enables the malware
author, apart from compromising the victim’s security and privacy, to orchestrate further attacks
and prolong the discovery of the attack.
In the past, the prevalent methodology was to establish a direct communication channel between
the Command and Control (C&C) server and the infected devices. However, this strategy had several
flaws, since blacklisting a specific IP or a domain name served as an effective takedown mechanism.
Nowadays, to counter direct communication issues, cybercriminals try to use communication chan-
nels that disguise the traffic as benign and cannot be easily blocked, e.g. social networks or use
multiple domains to manage infected hosts. In the latter case, the adversary uses a Domain Gener-
ation Algorithm (DGA) to periodically generate multiple domains which can be used as rendezvous
points to retrieve updates and commands. However, only a few of them are registered. Therefore,
the C&C server can be transferred from one domain to another without losing control of the com-
promised devices. In addition to the dynamic domain transfers, the lack of proper reporting from
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domain registrars aggravates the problem, since requests made from law enforcement authorities
and security practitioners may receive delayed responses, hindering botnet detection. Therefore, the
use of a DGA introduces an asymmetry of cost for the attacker and the defender, as the former has
only a minimal cost to register the domains while it is impossible for the latter to block all possible
domains.
1.1 Motivation and Contributions
DGAs come in different flavours depending on how they generate the domain names. The general
rule is that they use a pseudo-random generator to create a string that is used as the domain name
that the infected hosts would query to reach the C&C server. To allow the botmaster and bots
to generate the same list of domain names, the DGA contains a set of preshared secrets, e.g. the
seed. If the generated domain name is a string that is completely random, then its entropy would be
rather high. This creates a criterion allowing one to differentiate algorithmically generated domain
(AGD) names from regular DNS queries.
To counter this detection method, some DGAs resort to using random combinations of words
which are extracted from predefined dictionaries. Therefore, these DGAs are often referred to as
wordlist-based DGAs. This way, wordlist-based DGAs bypass many security mechanisms as the
generated domains not only have a low entropy, but they also appear to be generated and requested
by humans. This is of particular relevance since more than 2/3 of the top domain list contains at
least one English word, and around 1/3 are entirely composed by English words [57]. Therefore,
distinguishing between benign and malicious word-based AGDs becomes a more challenging task.
In this work, we illustrate that AGDs can be easily identified by the fact that wordlist-based
DGAs use a limited dictionary which results in often word repetitions. In this regard, we either
exploit the well-known “birthday problem” and populate custom dictionaries from the Non-existent
Internet Domains (NXDomains) that a host queries, or the structure of the domains they produce.
Once the queries exceed some quota, we consider that a malware that uses a DGA has infected the
host. Despite its simplicity, our method manages to be efficient in terms of both computational
effort and detection, allowing it to be easily deployed in existing environments. Notably, the method
is more efficient and accurate than current state of the art, managing to throttle all such DGAs
after only a few NXDomain requests without the need for training. Moreover, beyond implementing
an additional support layer to detect well-known DGA families, our method can detect new such
DGA families, since it does not depend on training data nor is constrained by domain-specific
features. Notably, our methodology is applied to a statistically sound dataset, containing all the
known wordlist-based DGA families up to date and 3,027,300 domains, which is by far the largest
and most complete dataset in the literature of studies for wordlist-based DGAs.
1.2 Organisation of this work
The rest of this work is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present the related work regarding
DGAs and detection methods. Then, in Section 3, we discuss the proposed methodology for identi-
fying the operation of a wordlist-based DGA malware, using only network traffic logs. In Section 4,
we describe our experimental setup, the datasets we utilise and our results. Afterwards, in Section 5,
we discuss the findings of our extensive experiments using our proposed methodology and compare it
to the current state of the art. Finally, the article concludes discussing future work and summarising
our contributions.
2 Related Work
Nowadays, malware developers use DGAs, which create a set of AGDs to communicate with C&C
servers, overcoming the drawbacks of static IP addresses [5, 35]. In essence, DGAs use a deterministic
pseudo-random generator (PRNG) to create a set of domain names [46, 38]. Therefore, the infected
devices query a set of domains generated by the DGA till they resolve to a valid IP (i.e. the C&C
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server), whose location may also change dynamically. In this regard, blacklisting domains is rendered
useless as it implies many practical issues.
According to the literature, there are two main families of DGAs: (i) Random-based DGA
methods, which use a PRNG to generate a set of characters to create a domain name, and (ii)
Dictionary/Wordlist-based DGA methods, which use a predefined dictionary of existing words to
generate such domains and thus, their detection becomes a more challenging task. There also exists
a minor subset of DGA families that use valid domains that were previously hacked to hide their
C&C servers (i.e. domain shadowing) [30] and DGAs that generate domain names that are very
similar to existing valid domains or the ones generated by other DGA families [1] hindering the
detection task. Considering the dependency of the pre-shared secret to time, Plohmann et al. [42]
further categorise DGAs to time-independent and deterministic, time-dependent and deterministic,
and time-dependent and non-deterministic. Fu et al. [21] proposed two DGAs which use hidden
Markov models (HMMs) and probabilistic context-free grammars (PCFGs) and tested them on
state-of-the-art detection systems. After analysing the outcomes by using metrics such as Kullback-
Leibler (KL) distance, Edit distance (ED), and Jaccard index, their results showed that these DGAs
hindered the detection rate of such approaches.
In the case of random-based DGA detection, a common practice is to analyse some features of
the domain names and their lexical characteristics to determine whether a DGA has generated them
[7, 54]. Moreover, auxiliary information such as WHOIS and DNS traffic (e.g. frequent NXDomain
responses) is often used to detect abnormal behaviours [61, 24, 4]. Other approaches use machine
learning-based techniques and combine the previous information to identify Random-based DGA
such as in [24, 55, 31, 59].
Nevertheless, many researchers have recently started focusing on the detection of wordlist-based
DGAs. In [14], authors propose the smashword score, a metric that uses n-gram overlapping com-
bined with information provided from WHOIS lookups to detect AGDs. The WordGraph method
[39] extracts dictionary information that is embedded in the malware using a graph-based approach,
which models repetitions and combinations of domain name strings. In [29], authors use a machine
learning approach based on recurrent neural networks trained using “familiar” (i.e. already known)
dictionaries to detect wordlist-based AGDs. Similarly, the work presented in [45] focuses on AGD
classification and characterisation, generating knowledge about the evolving behaviour of botnets.
The authors of [3] propose a generative adversarial network (GAN), which can learn and bypass
classical deep learning detectors. Thereafter, such acquired information is used as feedback to the
system to improve the accuracy of the AGD detectors. Neural Networks are also used to classify
domain names based on word-level information in [26]. More concretely, researchers use ELMo [40],
a context-sensitive word embedding, and a classification network that consists of a fully-connected
layer with 128 rectified linear units and a logistic regression output layer. In [50], the authors pro-
pose an improvement of Phoenix botnet detection [45] by using a modified Mahalanobis distance
metric to perform classification as well as a variant of k-means to increase clustering effectiveness.
The work described in [51] proposes a short-term memory network (LSTM), which uses raw domain
names as features to perform binary classification. Yang et al. proposed a classification based on
a set of features such as word correlations, frequency, and part-of-speech tags in [56]. Later, they
enhanced their detection mechanism by the use of inter-word and inter-domain correlations using
semantic analysis [57]. Spooren et al. [47] recently showed that their deep learning recurrent neu-
ral network is significantly better than classical machine learning approaches. More interestingly
though, they showed that one of the dangers of manual feature engineering is that an adversary may
adapt her strategy if she knows which features are used in the detection. To this end, they introduce
properly crafted DGAs that bypass these classifiers. Berman [8] developed a method based on Cap-
sule Networks (CapsNet) to detect AGDs. They compare their method with well-known approaches
such as RNNs and CNNs, and the outcomes showed that the accuracy obtained by CapsNet was
similar with better performance. Xu et al. [53] proposed the combination of n-gram and a deep
CNNs to create an n-gram combined character-based domain classification (n-CBDC) model. Their
model runs in an end-to-end way and does not require from domain feature extraction, enhancing its
performance. Vinayakumar et al. [52] implemented a set of deep learning architectures with Keras
Embedding and classical machine learning algorithms to classify DGA families. Their best reported
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configuration is obtained when using RNNs with SVM with radial basis function (SVM-RBF). For
a detailed overview and classification of methods of how malicious domains can be detected, the
interested reader may refer to [60].
In a recent work [36], the authors extend the notion of DGAs into a more generic one, namely
Resource Identifier Generation Algorithms (RIGA) which allows the use of other protocols beyond
DNS. In this regard, authors show how decentralised permanent storage (DPS), although being a
useful technology able to enhance a myriad of applications, has some potential drawbacks and ex-
ploitable characteristics for armouring a botnet as already exploited in the real world [27], primarily
due to its immutability properties. Therefore, the authors showcase the potential risks and opportu-
nities for malware creators and raise awareness about the symbiotic relationship between DPS and
malware campaigns. Finally, due to recent advances and the widespread use of covert/encrypted
communication channels (e.g. DNSCurve, DNS over HTTPS and DNS over TLS) malware creators
have an additional layer to hide their communications, rendering traditional DGA detection mech-
anisms useless. Nevertheless, as shown in [37], NXDomain detection can still be performed in such
a scenario as well as feature extraction so that DGA families can be further classified with high
accuracy.
In addition to the related work analysis, we argue that it is also worth discussing the fact that
NXDomain requests may be a result of user typewriting errors. Each human produces different
typing patterns depending on the writing surface (e.g. keyboard, smartphone, or larger touch screen
surfaces such as tablets) [20] and according to its physical and physiological conditions [19, 13],
which can be used, for instance, to uniquely identify an individual. Nevertheless, typewriting errors
are strongly influenced by the language and therefore, exhibit common characteristics regardless of
one’s typing pattern. The most common typing errors [15, 41] (more than 80%) are caused by (i)
transposition of two adjacent letters, (ii) adding one extra letter, (iii) one missing letter or (iv) one
wrong letter. Therefore, such errors can be corrected backspacing or moving the cursor to the point
at which the error occurred and then retyping [25].
As previously discussed, although typewriting errors may lead to NXDomain with high prob-
ability, usually lots of similar domain names to the original are often registered [10, 18] to avoid
homograph attacks [22]. Moreover, several techniques which aim to overcome homograph attacks
can be found in the literature. For example, in [49], authors designed an accurate typo categorisation
framework and found that typosquatting using parked ads and similar monetisation techniques exist
for popular domains as well as in the Alexa list. To mitigate this problem, the authors implemented
typosquatting blacklists and a browser plugin to prevent mistyping at the user side. In the case
of [34], the authors analyse the main typosquatting issues and monetisation market behind it and
recall the effectiveness of several policies and efforts to regulate typosquatting. More recently, novel
approaches [48] developed by the Google Chrome security team, implement suggestions for lookalike
URLs, which also prevent typewriting errors. These techniques, added to the fact that most domains
are queried after using a search engine, historical data and bookmarks, vastly reduce the number of
domains accessed directly through typewriting [9, 6].
Therefore, we can safely assume that typosquatted domains or homograph attacks represent a
marginal percentage or potential danger (compared to DGA queries, which are much more frequent)
taking into account the aforementioned prevention and security measures.
3 Proposed methodology
As already discussed, wordlist-based DGAs have predefined dictionaries that they use to create the
possible domains that the malware would try to connect to find the C&C server. In our methodology,
we exploit the fact that this set is often rather constrained, so we expect to have often repetitions
of words in the NXDomain requests. The general methodology can be summarised as follows. A
monitoring mechanism collects all the NXDomain requests performed by hosts. These domains are
split into words, and those words are divided into buckets. The buckets are filled with words either
statistically (each word has an individual bucket) or because they fit a specific pattern. Once a
bucket, or a set of buckets, reaches a threshold, an alert is raised.
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In what follows, we assume that the monitoring mechanism has a cache that stores the result
and would either periodically wipe them after an epoch T or wipe records that are older than T .
This prevents the mechanism of reporting attacks as a result of, e.g. old typing errors which are
stacked over time.
To facilitate the reader, we consider a simple scenario and gradually build on this one to describe
our proposal. In our scenario, we have a wordlist-based DGA which selects two words from a
dictionary of n words. It adds a separator symbol (e.g. -) between them, and then appends a top-
level domain (TLD) from a predefined set. If we assume that n is small, then from the well-known
“birthday problem” [33] we expect to have a collision, that is a word being repeated, in approximately√
n domain name generations. More precisely, the latter is expected to happen with 50% probability.
Setting the threshold of repetitions too low, e.g. 2, it is evident that may lead to many false
positives as a user may have mistyped a domain name. This small amount of false positives is an
acceptable trade-off in the event of human errors; as described in Section 2). Although typewriting
attacks are much less frequent than DGA-based malware, as discussed in Section 2, one may set
the threshold for repetitions of words in domain names higher to allow for some grace for typos. In
what follows, we denote this threshold as t.
Generalising the above, one DGA may have k dictionaries and generate each fragment of the
domain name by selecting a word from each dictionary. Therefore, we may formalise our problem
as follows:
Problem setting: Let us assume that a DGA has k dictionaries di, i ∈ {1, ..., k}. The DGA uses
words (denoted as w) to create domain names of the form dom such that:
dom = w1||w2||...||wk, wi ∈ di, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3, ..., k}.
That is, dom is the ordered concatenation (||) of k words by randomly selecting one word from
each dictionary and putting them in the same order as their dictionaries. Find the probability p of
having at least one word from any of the dictionaries being selected at least t times, for t constant.
It is clear that the case of having one dictionary (k = 1) and requesting one collision (t = 2) is the
well-known birthday problem. Levin [28] and Diaconis and Mosteller [16] have thoroughly studied
the birthday problem and its extensions. Based on their proofs, we have that the probability p of
having t collisions on a dictionary of L words in n trials is subject to the following approximation:
ne−n/Lt(
1− NL(t+1)
)1/t ≈ (Lt−1t! log( 11− p
))1/t
.
Therefore, solving for p we have that:
p ≈ 1− exp
−
L1−t
(
ne−
n
Lt
(
1− nL(t+1)
)−1/t)t
t!
 .
.
From the latter approximation, and the fact that in the generic wordlist-based DGAs, discussed
above, the collisions may affect different dictionaries are independent; one can compute the proba-
bility of a t-collision as follows:
P (t− collision) =
k∑
i=1
pi,
where:
pi = 1− exp
−
L1−ti
(
ne
− nLit
(
1− nLi(t+1)
)−1/t)t
t!
 .
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and Li denotes the length of dictionary di.
Going a step further, let us assume that we have captured an NXDomain name request from
a host. We may split the name to see the pattern of the domain name in terms of structure. For
instance, the domain name consists of 2 or 3 words with a total length above M characters. Note
that DGAs tend to have rather long domain names to, e.g. maximise the chances of purchasing
the domains they want and avoid compromised machines contacting existing domains. Therefore,
due to the way wordlist-based DGAs work, requests to NXDomains which have long names or with
a specific amount of concatenated words may imply the existence of an infected machine. More
precisely, wordlist-based DGAs often have a static template of the form, e.g. w1||w2.TLD (see DGAs
like nymaim, pizd, and suppobox) or w1||w2||...||wm.TLD so that:
|w1|+ |w2|+ ... + |wm| > M,
which contents would change according to each DGA. As it is shown in Section 4, typical user DNS
queries do not follow this template.
Therefore, the proposed methodology is a two-layer filter for the collected NXDomains. By
default, DNS queries are performed in cleartext format and can be captured by any network device
that is hosted in the same network. Therefore, a network monitoring device can passively collect
all DNS queries performed in the network and submit the NXDomains for processing in our two-
filter mechanism. The first filter has a threshold based on word repetitions, while the second one
keeps track of the patterns that recent domains have in terms of words, letters and structure. The
proposed methodology is illustrated in Figure 1.
First, the network monitoring mechanism collects all the DNS queries and logs all NXDomain
requests. Each such request is analysed by the two filters to check whether a threshold is exceeded.
To do so, we first remove the TLD of the domain request, and we keep only the SLD which is
analysed. The bulk of the literature studies SLDs only, as TLDs offer little information and they
are well-known and fixed. Third level domains, since any anomaly in them, can be easily detected
and handled controlled by the owner of the SLD are not considered in the related work. Next, the
first filter receives as an input the SLD, splits it into words and sets a counter for each word that
appears in such analysis. Once the counter of a word exceeds a given threshold T , a warning is
issued. In parallel, the SLD is analysed for structural patterns, e.g. number of words, total length
etc. as discussed in section 4. Again, if the counter that keeps track of repetitions of these patterns
exceeds a given threshold T ′, a warning is raised.
As it will be discussed in Section 5, the two-layer approach manages to provide high reliability,
accuracy, and robustness. Moreover, due to the template that such AGDs are expected to have, our
methodology is generic enough to counter other and non-reported wordlist-based DGAs.
4 Experiments
In this section, first, we describe the setup and methodology of our experiments. Next, we use the
implementation of several DGAs, as provided by researchers12 who have reversed engineered the
corresponding malware that embeds them, the real-world captures of the DGArchive [42], and two
DGAs that were designed to bypass machine learning algorithms [47]. More concretely, we study
the following DGA families: beebone, banjori, gozi, matsnu, nymaim2, pizd, rovnix, suppobox
and volatilecedar. Apart from studying only wordlist-based DGAs (gozi, matsnu, nymaim2, pizd,
rovnix, and suppobox) we include in our dataset two arithmetic-based DGAs beebone) and banjori
and one permutation-based (volatilecedar) to see the effectiveness of our method in other families
of DGAs. Finally, we have included the two DGA familes from [47], that we refer to as decept1
and decept2 which were crafted to bypass machine learning-based mechanisms. Table 1 provides
an overview of our dataset. To this end, the table shows how many samples each DGA has and how
many seeds. Moreover, we provide ten AGDs from each DGA in our dataset to facilitate the reader
in understanding the AGDs of each DGA produces. The underlying dictionaries vary in length,
1https://github.com/baderj/domain_generation_algorithms https://github.com/andrewaeva/DGA
2https://github.com/ynvb/ExplosiveScripts
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Figure 1: An illustration of the proposed methodology. Network devices (see below) perform DNS
queries which are captured by the monitoring mechanism. Our filters then process all NXDomain
requests, and if they exceed specific thresholds, the corresponding alerts are raised.
origin, and amount for each DGA. More precisely, matsnu contains two dictionaries, one for verbs
(878) and one for nouns (1008). Depending on the seed its AGDs will either always start from a
verb or a noun. Then, using the seed for its PRNG, matsnu selects one word from each dictionary
iteratively from each dictionary, until the length of the domain exceeds 24 characters. nymaim2 uses
two dictionaries, one for the first word (2450 words) and one for the second one (4387 words) which
are concatenated either directly without any separator or with the “-” character. pizd uses by
default a wordlist containing 384 words and uses a PRNG to select two words and concatenate them
to generate an AGD. rovnix uses as its source the US Declaration of Independence. The dictionary
contains all the alphanumeric words of the document. To construct an AGD, rovnix selects words
according to a PRNG until the selected words exceed the 20 characters. gozi is a variant of rovnix.
Its various dictionaries originate from various public domain documents that are unlikely to be
moved to another location, e.g. Request for Comments pages and the GNU Lesser General Public
License. From these documents, gozi splits the documents according to stop characters (spaces,
commas, etc.) and selects the words with at least three characters that contain only letters. From
this wordlist, the PRNG selects random words that are concatenated so that the resulting AGD
contains between 12 and 23 characters. Suppobox in the three seeds that have been identified so far
has a dictionary of 384 words from which it selects two random words and concatenates them.
In our dataset, we have also added the top 1 million websites from Alexa. The reason for including
this is to have some ground truth of benign traffic and illustrate the domains that an actual user
would use is significantly different from the ones that would be derived from a DGA, even if they are
made to do so. It should be noted here that the Alexa top 1 million dataset contains web pages and
not domains. Therefore, there are repetitions of domains, e.g. blogspot. Moreover, there are several
Internationalized domain names (IDN)3 (i.e. domains that start with the characters xn-- therefore,
the domain name cannot contain any word. We opted to remove the latter domains and to keep
each domain once. Note that up to now, there is no DGAs using IDN domain names. Therefore,
the alexa dataset consists of 793,606 domains.
Using real data from the DGArchive [17] and the reversed code, we collect the set of the domain
names they create. The total AGDs are 2,533,694 and adding the benign domains from alexa; we
end up with a dataset of 3,327,300 domains. Therefore, each domain in these datasets is processed
to extract the words that were concatenated to generate them. This is achieved with the use of
3https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/idn-2012-02-25-en
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Table 1: Overview of our dataset.
DGA Type # of samples Seeds Sample domains
alexa Benign 793,606 - google.com, youtube.com, tmall.com, baidu.com,
qq.com
beebone Arithmetic 210 2 backdates0.com, backdates0.org, backdates0.net, back-
dates0.biz, backdates0.info
banjori Arithmetic 452,235 35 andersensinaix.com, xjsrrsensinaix.com, hlrfrsensi-
naix.com, fnosrsensinaix.com, qcwcrsensinaix.com
decept ML 150,000 1 ytrbegofitr8b, rithundiat, tarenoth200qyumurop, ha-
toranfa, xunrvrstbe
decept2 ML 150,000 1 tafersickir, pblogalmarportran-f, martapord, joe-
davingsbiosk, prialtions
gozi Wordlist 216,355 104 penarumsalpaesthodie.com, quodquibusfulmi-
natcur.com, defunctorumnullamrelaxat.com, ve-
niarumcuramhabet.com, nisisacerdotipapefalse.com
matsnu Wordlist 117,401 3 starsendbottomhabitshake.com, causeirongroundnet-
tellstart.com, cultureexploredogdistrict.com, sizepro-
grambillsaypointpot.com, tourmentionboneconcertad-
mire.com
nymaim2 Wordlist 23,424 1 squirting-eight.net, unitsedgar.net, sexuality-giant.net,
utilitiespour.ki, vermontfeatures.ad
pizd Wordlist 10,000 1 aboveshare.net, alreadyshare.net, actionprobable.net,
althoughprobable.net, actionseveral.net
rovnix Wordlist 100,000 1 theirtheandaloneinto.com, thathistoryformertrial.com,
tothelayingthatarefor.com, definebritainhasforhe.com,
tosecureonweestablishment.com
suppobox Wordlist 1,313,571 3 possibleshake.net, mountainshare.net, possible-
share.net, perhapsnearly.net, windownearly.net
volatilecedar Permutation 498 2 deotntexplorer.info, doetntexplorer.info, dotentex-
plorer.info, dotnetexplorer.info, dotnteexplorer.info
Total 3,327,300
Wordninja4, a natural language processing (NLP) method that probabilistically splits concatenated
words based on English Wikipedia uni-gram frequencies.
In both filters, we assume that the network monitoring device intercepts all the NXDomain
requests from each device and analyses them for each one individually. For the sake of clarity, we
assume that the network monitoring device gets as input a stream of NXDomain requests from
only one device. Moreover, we assume that the device is infected by only one malware with DGA
capabilities, and therefore the malware uses one seed. In our experiments, this practically means
that each one of them has to be executed per DGA family and using one seed at a time. We argue
that this is strategy is correct as the malware will not manage to connect directly to the C&C server
and several connections would be attempted before the malware manages to connect and receives
the command to, e.g. use a different dictionary/seed. Note that in our DGA dataset, the different
seed in several cases translates to the use of another dictionary.
In the first set of experiments, we test the frequency of word collisions on specific thresholds. More
precisely, we split each domain name in words and record their occurrences if their length is more
than three letters to avoid articles, pronouns etc. Based on a threshold of how many occurrences we
expect from an AGD during an epoch, we monitor all NXDomain requests and raise an alert when
the threshold is reached. To provide better insight on these results, more to than simply reporting
the first time that an NXDomain query is performed for each AGD and seed in our dataset, we
shuffled them and made the same measurement 1,000 times. In Figure 2, we illustrate the results for
different threshold levels, which range from 3 to 7. By shuffling the domains that a DGA generates,
we test the DGA with different possible seeds, far more than the ones we originally had. Since the use
of different seed is a common practice in malware, we may study how our methodology performs in
different settings, and show that it is generic enough to be used in various configurations. Although
this threshold can be modified, we claim that three unrelated NXDomain queries that contain the
4https://github.com/keredson/wordninja
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Figure 2: Number of domains, generated by each DGA family, that are needed to reach the strike
threshold.
same word are likely not to be generated by a human, according to Section 2 as well as discussed in
our problem setting. This hypothesis is confirmed from our first experiment, which shows that our
word filter is able to detect the domains generated by each family of DGA accurately.
alexa beebone gozi matsnu nymaim2 pizd rovnix suppoboxvolatilecedar
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(a) Average letters per domain.
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(b) Average words per domain.
Figure 3: Textual statistics for Alexa top 100K and the DGA families studied.
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We conducted another set of experiments to study the statistical difference that the wordlist-
based DGAs have from regular domains. Intuitively, we argue that the “poor” dictionary that
these DGAs have would result in often repeating the same words in NXDomain queries as well as
exhibiting some identifiable patterns. To this end, we analyse the textual statistical properties of
the previously selected DGA families. Next, we compare them with those obtained in the case of
Alexa top 1 million domains, and we depict the results in Figure 3. Based on these statistics, we
create a filter as follows. We keep a short registry of the five most recent NXDomain requests, and
we check whether any of the following criteria holds:
• All the requests are above ten characters.
• The amount of words in all requests are the same.
• The amount of words in all requests is above 2.
• The amount of the “short” words (less than four characters) are more than 2 in all requests.
• All the requests are made to the same SLD and different TLD.
The results of this process are illustrated in Figure 4. While this pattern approach introduces
a bias in terms of language constraints, it is something that can be resolved by extending the
dictionary of the underlying splitting algorithm. This extension may solve the issue for Latin-based
dictionaries; however, this does not resolve the case of IDNs. Apparently, this filter manages to
efficiently determine the lexicographical structure of the domain name, having high accuracy and
low false positives and negatives. Moreover, it complements the previous filter by keeping a record
of how many times a specific lexicographical structure was identified. Should these occurrences pass
a threshold during a predefined epoch, the corresponding alert is raised.
As in the previous case, we performed our experiments 1,000 times. It is evident that our filter
shows significant differences between AGDs and alexa. Notably, while there are some outliers for
all DGAs the average of the counter is close to 5, with the highest being 5.24 from suppobox, while
alexa had an average of 24.19 requests. We believe that the above illustrate that almost all DGAs
could be identified with at most six requests.
alexa banjori beebone gozi matsnu nymaim2 pizd rovnix suppobox volatilecedar
20
40
60
80
100
Figure 4: Number of requests needed to pass the pattern criterion threshold.
Finally, we used our pattern approach on the hard to detect DGAs crafted in [47]. Both DGAs
scored higher than the other DGA. Interestingly, the average of 1,000 experiments showed that
decept was marginally harder than decept2, requiring 7.82 and 7.115 queries in average, respec-
tively.
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5 Discussion
In this section, we discuss the results of the experiments of the previous Section 4 as well as the main
benefits of our approach and how it compares to the current state of the art. The results depicted
in Figure 2 show that all the DGA families evaluated can be detected with only a few NXDomain
queries (each domain resulting in a set of processed words), except nymaim2. This means that the
AGDs generated by them tend to repeat words with statistical significance, as detected by our word-
based filter. In the simplest case (i.e. with a threshold of 3 words, cf Figure 2a) we can detect AGDs
with less than 30 NXDomain queries in almost all cases. For instance, the malware gozi uses 3 times
the same word after generating 28 domains (see Figure 2a). In addition, the growth pace exhibited
in Figure 2, in terms of NXDomain queries needed to reach from 3 to 7 strikes, exhibits the same
growth pace as the probabilities defined in Section 3. The latter implies that, proportionally, the
number of strikes grows faster than the number NXDomains analysed.
In the case of nymaim2, the results show that we need a high amount of NXDomains to find
coincidences (see Figure 2f). This occurs because nymaim2 uses a predefined structure to create
domains in which two words, selected from two separate dictionaries with 2450 and 4387 words,
respectively, are appended to a TLD (i.e. the number of possible TLDs is 74). Therefore, the
amount of possible combinations hinders its detection. Nevertheless, this variability is only in the
dictionary, and since the structure remains the same, it is captured by our pattern filter. It is worth
noting that beebone needs a constant number of queries to be detected by our word filter as the
words that act as prefix/suffix are constant (cf Table 1) in all queries. Therefore, they both trigger
the alert in as many queries as the threshold is.
It is clear from Figure 3 that benign domain names most likely consist of at most three words
containing less than ten letters in total. Therefore, NXDomain requests that do not meet these
criteria can be considered as ‘suspicious’ by our pattern-based filter. Our claim is verified by the
results of our pattern filter in alexa (cf. Figure 4), since the number of domains needed to pass the
threshold is far higher than those required by the rest of DGAs. Note that the pattern-based filter
can fully capture nymaim2 behaviour (as well as the rest of families, with few exceptions) so that we
can raise an alert faster than our word-based filter in such cases.
Finally, it is worth noticing that the bulk of hash and arithmetic-based DGAs, such as Dyre,
Gameover, Gspy and Omexo, produce domains that are long (more than 15 characters) and as they
are hex-encoded, they hardly create words. Therefore, all such AGDs fail our structure criterion.
Moreover, AGDs generated by other DGA families, including DNS Changer, DiamondFox, DirCrypt
and EKforward also fail our structure criterion, as they might generate shorter domains, but the
produced domains do not have meaningful words.
Table 2: Comparison of the detection accuracy (in percentage) between to most recent state-of-the-
art methods. In each case, we report the best values.
DGA [26] [51] [8] [14] [53] [57] [52] [21] Our Method
beebone 90.46 100 74.9 100
banjori 99.84 100 80.8 99.78 0 100
decept 100
decept2 100
gozi 0 77.3 97.98 100
hmm-dga 48.67 100
matsnu 98.74 0 0 89.1 96.91 100 100
nymaim2 100
pcfg-dga 48.1 100
pizd 98.76 91.96 100
rovnix 98.71 80.5 100
suppobox 98.74 35.42 87.82 56.8 98.18 84.17 82.1 100
volatilecedar 100 100 95.8 100
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To showcase the efficacy of our method, we compared it with the most recent state-of-the-
art. The outcomes of each method are depicted in Table 2. It can be observed that none of the
methods compared includes the whole list of word-based DGAs analysed in this article, as stated
in the Motivation section. In terms of accuracy, we can observe that most of the methods succeed
to provide a remarkable accuracy in at least one of the families, with the exception of the work
presented in [52]. Moreover, in many cases, the size of the samples evaluated is extremely small (i.e.
which evinces the difficulty to obtain a quality database such as the one used in this article). For
instance, in the case of Tran et al. [51], we observe that authors train their system with a rather
constrained dataset, e.g. they use 42,166 banjori domains and only 42 beebone domains. Another
example can be found in [14], where authors use only 250 samples in the case of suppobox. After
a deeper analysis of the outcomes, we observed a common trend in most of them. More concretely,
when a method can accurately detect a DGA family, it fails to detect others, due to the particular
characteristics of each DGA, as seen in [51, 8, 14, 57, 52]. Note that there are cases where the method
is not able to capture any instance of a DGA (i.e. the reported accuracy is 0). In addition, some
of the families are only explored in this paper (i.e. nymaim2) as well as decept, decept2, hmm-dga,
and pcfg-dga, which are only analysed by their creators [21, 47] by using state-of-the-art methods.
More precisely, in the case of hmm-dga and pcfg-dga, the accuracies reported are below 49% for
both DGAs using the Botdigger [58] DGA detector, and in the case of decept and decept2 the
accuracy is below 85% using LTSM. Finally, it is worth mentioning that when some DGAs change
their seed, the accuracy of their detection drops significantly, as stated by Berman [8] in the case
of pizd and suppobox. However, the latter behaviour does not affect our method, since it only
implies a restart of the word counter. In addition, we did not include the works presented in [39]
and [29] due to their database size, since they train their methods with a high amount of domains, in
some cases orders of magnitude higher than the queries needed by our method to detect them. For
instance, in [39], authors use 8-day real traffic data, resulting in thousands of domains. In the case
of [29], they use tens of thousand queries generated by banjori, gozi, nymaim2, rovnix, suppobox,
matsnu (i.e. with low detection accuracy in the case of matsnu, which is below 0.16), and hundreds
of queries in the case of beebone and volatilecedar, to train their system using a 10-fold scheme.
Another recent work, proposed by Yang et al. in [57], uses machine learning and semantic analysis
to detect two DGA families, namely suppobox and matsnu. Using different dataset configurations,
they report accuracies between 83.63% and 86.23% for suppobox and between 88% and 100% in
the case of matsnu. Although they also consider an additional set of unclassified word-based AGDs,
their average detection accuracy is 80.58%, which is significantly lower than our proposed work.
Finally, in work presented by Spooren et al. [47], the authors achieve different accuracies depending
on the classifier and the parameters. In general, the random forest classifier is rendered useless for
decept and decept2 with accuracies below 60%. In the case of LTSM, the classification accuracy
for such families is also lower (i.e. 85.5%) than ours.
In summary, in addition to absolute accuracy in DGA detection, our method enables a set
of benefits, compared to other well-known literature methods based on neural networks or other
feature-based classification mechanisms [26, 51, 39, 29, 57, 47]. More concretely, our method can
be deployed instantly and is parallel by design. In addition, it does not require training, contrary
to the aforementioned approaches, enabling the adaptable discovery and detection of novel DGA
families. Note that, since they require training, Neural Networks are sensitive to dictionary changes,
hence providing less robust outcomes for real-time DGA analysis than our approach. As a further
enhancement, our pattern-based setting can filter out almost instantly DGAs, which means that only
a minimal subset needs to be further analysed. Moreover, our word-based filter only needs a small
number of NXDomain queries to achieve DGA detection. This also enables personalised policies,
where benign domains that fall out of the threshold can be whitelisted since their amount would
be relatively small. We also argue that the fast detection of decept and decept2 signify another
advantage of our methodology. More precisely, while these DGAs are crafted to exploit many
character features, they fail to be meaningful enough and end up being detected by our pattern
filter. Finally, paired with recent advances in human typewriting error detection and application
layers preventing such behaviour, the robustness of our method can be highly enhanced.
It is worth noting that the proposed method is directly affected by the language of the dictionaries
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and their size. Large dictionaries, as seen in the case of nymaim2, imply a longer detection threshold.
On the other hand, the case of using other languages for the dictionaries implies another issue for
the method. Nevertheless, the latter is the same for all methods targeting these DGAs, as they
all depend on the knowledge of the used language to split the words accordingly and perform their
analysis.
6 Conclusion
In this work, we analyse the current state of the art in Domain Generation Algorithms, a family of
algorithms that use pseudo-random generators to create a set of AGDs, used as rendezvous points
for their C&C servers. More concretely, we focus on DGA families which use wordlists to generate
such domains. Therefore, to provide efficient and accurate detection of wordlist-based DGAs, we
propose a probabilistic method inspired by the “birthday paradox” and the structure that these
generators have. In this regard, our method exhibits a series of benefits compared with other
state-of-the-art methods, since it can be instantly deployed, requires no training and can filter the
bulk of domain names in terms of their pattern construction, enabling efficient and adaptable DGA
detection. Moreover, extensive experiments using state-of-the-art benchmarks show that we need
between 3 and 27 NXDomain queries (with strike threshold set to 3) to detect DGA malware with
high confidence using our word-based filter. Future work will focus on analysing the statistical
properties of benign domains (including IDN), especially in the case of Alexa, to enhance their
classification using different wordlist-based probabilistic word splitters.
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